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 This thesis sought to determine the origins of public policy during the American 
Civil War and how this policy developed to address the question of the African American 
experience in the Union. The scope of this study relates to developmental policy between 
1861 and 1865 in the Union. My research for this study comes almost entirely from first 
hands accounts in the form diaries, letters, documents, and official reports. The three 
chapters of this thesis allow me to take a close look at three policy areas as well as their 
origins and affects. The three aspects I studied were policy relating to the status of 
former or current slaves, the Union policy for African American enlistment in the army 
and finally, the policy addressing the Southern Antebellum way of life as it relates to the 
institution of slavery itself. I chose people who initiated decisions and generated ideas 
outside of traditional avenues of legislative power that left their mark on official United 
States policy.  
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The American Civil War created an opportunity for individuals without 
traditional legislative power to step into roles granting them great influence over public 
policy decisions. In a time of social and political turmoil, those who had been previously 
ordinary members of society found themselves in positions of influence. Between the 
years 1861 and 1865, new opportunities were presented to government officials, soldiers, 
and civilians. This thesis will explore the way policy was developed in the years during 
the Civil War through the lens of its origins and its application to the question of slavery 
and the status of African Americans in the United States.  
Historically, our understanding of policy formation rests mainly with Congress, 
the presidential administration, or other government affiliates or officials. I would like 
to challenge that idea in this thesis and explore the ways in which ordinary people and 
military officers developed policy initiatives and solutions in the midst of the Civil War. 
The traditional avenues of policy production were somewhat altered due to the war, 
leaving space for new voices and answers to arise. While other wars or times of upheaval 
have generated new avenues for policy, I will be looking at the Civil War as a specific 
study of this phenomenon. The scope of this research is limited to the years between 
1860 and 1865 and the study of only policy that relates to the freedoms and experiences 
of African Americans living in the United States.  
While the war generals and officials being examined here were, in some sense, in 
places of power, I would like to explore the ways in which they defied their traditional 
stations to interact with policy. This thesis will look at levels of power in a nuanced way; 
in looking at groups of individuals without power, there are critical differences to be 
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aware of. Generals and military officers had some political favor to have been granted 
their positions as leaders, but not as much as the those in Congress or the executive 
administration. Civilians and soldiers, by contrast, had even less power and favor as 
they were not truly leaders, but they did have some agency in influencing their stations. 
Finally, African American individuals and slaves had the least power and favor in this 
situation. They had neither social nor political power or influence and were often at the 
whims of other groups of people. So, while I identify all three groups of these individuals 
(officers, soldiers, civilians, and African Americans) as less powerful, there are 
important nuances to their identity; they were not all equally powerless.  
The scope of my research includes many important political, military and civilian 
players. While I wanted each of my case studies to relate back to the topic of policy 
surrounding Black Americans, I also wanted to have a varied array of sources. My 
criterion for selecting the people I studied in this thesis was based on what information 
was available on them or their actions. For war generals, I looked for the paper trail that 
would show their actions had an impact or influenced a policy. I wanted to find people 
whose decisions were not only revolutionary, but also rendered a response from others. 
So, I looked for the generals who implemented policies and received letters or 
noteworthy remarks from the War Department, Lincoln, reporters, civilians or soldiers. 
I tried to find examples of fledgling policies that I could follow from their infant stages 
to (in some cases) their passage by Congress. My criterion for studying civilian or soldier 
involvement was based, again, on how frequently they were mentioned in letters or 
official documents. I use examples of reporters whose writings were mentioned 
frequently by others and read widely by the public. I also used civilians or soldiers who 
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were mentioned in letters by military personnel or in diaries of others who were there to 
witness their actions. These instances of recognition and acclaim help bolster my 
argument that these examples of policy generation were not insular.    
In this thesis, I will attempt to address multiple interconnected areas in which 
policy was created, influenced, and implemented. I will look to those who were not in 
traditional legislative roles but responded to the issue of slavery and status of free Black 
men and women. The three policy areas I identify in my research are the status of 
African Americans and free slaves in the Union during the war, the enlistment of African 
American soldiers in the Union army, and informal policy that aimed to cripple the 
cultural power of Southern plantations in the Confederacy.  
In my first chapter I will discuss the ways in which American war generals 
handled the question of slavery and how to proceed with freed African Americans when 
their own president had remained unclear on the issue. I will identify the language they 
used through letters, wartime documents, diaries, and general orders. This will be a 
study of people who influenced the decisions that led up to milestone policies like the 
Emancipation Proclamation and early integration of former slaves into Union life.  
The second chapter of this thesis will explore the ways in which the policy that 
opened the door for Black soldiers to enlist in the Union army was an effort that began 
low in the ranks of political power. This chapter will examine the first efforts of military 
officials to raise African American regiments in areas across the Union. A specific aspect 
of this process I will be analyzing is the importance of the press and civilians in the call 
for allowing Black soldiers in the Union army. This policy initiative was pushed forward 
by many civilians as well as military officials and through a robust selection of letters, 
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newspapers, and military orders it will become clear that the official policy was 
developed from the ground up.  
My final chapter will focus on the ways in which military officials outside of 
official places of power devised informal policy to cripple the morale of the plantation-
based Southern society. The informal policy initiatives begun in the field were the tactics 
of living off the land, destroying property and freeing slaves who were still living on 
plantations. Military leaders like William T. Sherman and Ulysses S. Grant led new 
initiatives to defeat the South by destroying and taking property as they traversed 
through the country. This new way to wage war created a policy that echoed throughout 
the rest of the war, into the Reconstruction era and beyond. The decisions made by these 
men began informal and formal policy on how to treat Southern property and respond 
to Southern policies and, I will argue, did not originate with the Lincoln administration 
or War Department.  
During the Civil War, the very notion of what the “Union” was and was to be 
stood in the balance. President Lincoln faced enormous pressure from those in the 
Union and those in the Confederacy alike; it took all the president’s attention to simply 
keep what was left of the United States together. In his attempt to appease the 
splintered American political spectrum, there was room for voices to assert new ideas 
and solutions to problems plaguing not just the army, but the nation as a whole. All over 
the war-torn states, officials and generals were challenging the very idea of what it 
meant to be property and what it meant to be free. With the displacement of power due 
to wartime dynamics those who had grasped at positions or never experienced true 
influence found themselves in the center of new policy decisions. Those in the field, 
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Democrat and Republican alike, were making assertions in the moment of crisis that, 
either partially or as a whole, echoed through policy decisions for days, weeks, months, 
and, in some cases, through history.  
 
  




“My paramount object in this struggle is to save the Union, and is not either to 
save or destroy slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing any slaves I would do 
it, and if I could save it by freeing all the slaves I would do it” 
- Abraham Lincoln, August 22, 1862 
Before President Abraham Lincoln was able to take his oath of office in March of 
1861, the United States was already in fractures. In the time between Lincoln’s election 
and his inauguration, seven states in the Union had seceded to form the Confederate 
States and its president, Jefferson Davis, had already been sworn into office. While 
official reasons for secession lay in a multitude of explanations, the greatest 
irreconcilable difference was the policy surrounding slavery. Slavery supported the 
economies of agriculturally based regions in the South and that created a rift between 
them and the largely wage-based labor market of most (certainly not all) Northern 
states. So, from the beginning of the war the question of slavery, its importance to 
society, and what to do with the possibility of emancipation loomed large over the 
United States government.  
Setting the Scene 
It is important to begin this chapter by establishing the way official members of 
the United States government were determining policy and what that policy was. 
Following the conflict at Fort Sumter, President Lincoln and his administration 
struggled to decide how exactly to address the rising tensions. He received advice in 
many forms from advisors. In one letter, Orville H. Browning, a friend of Lincoln’s, 
wrote, “We can’t avoid considering and dealing with this question if we would. We must 
  11 
 
  
meet it, solve it, and we had better do it…before the emergency is upon us.”1 Browning 
urged Lincoln to address the question of what was to be done with policy handling 
slavery. He recognized what would come to pass; the issue would be forced upon 
Lincoln by way of necessity and his administration needed to be ready. So, it was not as 
if Lincoln had no one telling him he should be prepared for the question of new policy 
on the status of currently enslaved people. Following this letter written in April of 1861, 
President Lincoln spoke before Congress in July. In his speech, he did not mention his 
policy on slavery. We know, though, that he was struggling with the issue as he had 
advisors weighing in and he said while preparing the message he would consider 
speaking on the topic.2 So, Lincoln intentionally did not take a strong stance on the 
issue, but rather chose to continue to ponder advice and monitor the situation closely.  
A few months later, after the war had officially broken out, Congress chose to 
make its official stance public. The Crittenden-Johnson Resolutions, proposed by House 
of Representatives member John J. Crittenden and Senator Andrew Johnson, 
established Congress’ view of the war. The resolution stated “that this war is not waged 
on their part in any spirit of oppression, or for any purpose of conquest or subjugation, 
or purpose of overthrowing or interfering with the rights or established institutions of 
those States, but to defend and maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.”3 This 
 
1 “Abraham Lincoln Papers: Series 1. General Correspondence. 1833-1916: Orville H. Browning to 
Abraham Lincoln, Tuesday, April 30, 1861 (Political and Military Affairs),” online text, Library of 
Congress, Washington, D.C. 20540 USA, accessed May 14, 2021, 
https://www.loc.gov/resource/mal.0949600/?sp=2. 
2 “Abraham Lincoln Papers: Series 1. General Correspondence. 1833-1916: Abraham Lincoln, [May-June 
1861] (Message to Congress, July 4, 1861, Second Printed Draft, with Changes in Lincoln’s Hand),” online 
text, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 20540 USA, accessed May 14, 2021, 
https://www.loc.gov/resource/mal.1057200/?sp=1&st=text. 
3 Brooks D. Simpson, Stephen W. Sears, and Aaron Sheehan-Dean, eds., The Civil War, The First Year 
Told by Those Who Lived It, vol. 1, 4 vols. (The Library of America, 2011). 
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resolution passed both the House and the Senate, making it official policy. This meant 
that Congress as a whole (not including those that voted against it or stood staunchly in 
the Radical Republican party) agreed to take no stance against, or for, the institution of 
slavery.   
So, at this time, the position of the traditional policy making branches of 
government agreed that the war was not and should not necessarily be waged to end 
slavery or to even address the question of slavery. As the war progressed, the views of 
these leaders changed and evolved with the conflict, but the foundation of policy was 
built upon these beliefs.  
One of the most influential and cryptic political minds throughout the Civil War, 
at least publicly, was President Lincoln. From personal letters and public statements, it 
is clear his views shifted in the years during the war, but his primary focus was to save 
the Union. In his campaign for the presidency and throughout the early days of his 
administration, Lincoln made it clear that he had no intention of abolishing slavery. 
Though, there are accounts like that of Frederick Douglass writing in Douglass’ Monthly 
that stated, “the Northern people have elected, against the slaveholding South, a man for 
president who declared his opposition to the further extension of slavery.”4 As Douglass 
claimed, Lincoln was clear in his views that, while not morally agreeing with slavery, he 
would only object to its spread. Douglass and other abolitionists constantly challenged 
Lincoln’s policy in addressing slavery, while others in the Union thought Lincoln too 
radical. He seemed an enigma to many and faced opposition in different political 
pockets.  
 
4 Simpson, Sears, and Sheehan-Dean, eds., The Civil War, The First Year, 58.  
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Another aspect of Lincoln’s policy setting seemed to stem from the public 
influence and decisions of his military leaders. Throughout the war, there was a clear 
power struggle between the officers themselves and the president. In a telling letter 
appointing commander of the Army of the Potomac, General Joseph Hooker, Lincoln 
said,  
I also believe you do not mix politics with your profession, in which you are right. You have 
confidence in yourself, which is a valuable, if not indispensable quality. You are ambitious, which, within 
reasonable bounds, does good rather than harm… And now, beware of rashness. Beware of rashness, but 
with energy, and sleepless vigilance, go forward and give us victories.5 
In this letter written in January of 1863, it is clear Lincoln has learned his lesson with 
outspoken generals and hoped Hooker had learned from them as well. It is obvious from 
Lincoln’s correspondences that he believed his generals should not dictate policy, and 
yet as we will see, these military officials determined some of the most consequential 
policy in the first few years of the war. 
Fort Monroe 
 One of the early hotbeds for policy creation was located in the area where 
Southern plantation land met Union army advancement at Fort Monroe, Virginia. In 
May 1861, just one month after Lincoln organized the Union militia to suppress the 
rebellion, the first significant policy involving slavery had begun to take shape.  
To understand the importance of Fort Monroe it is key to understand the Fugitive 
Slave Act of 1850. This act established that someone could claim an individual as a 
runaway slave with the correct proof and “reclaim” them for service. Since its passage 
 
5 Murphy, Justin D., ed., The American Civil War: Interpreting Documents Through Primary 
Documents, vol. 2, 2 vols. (ABC-CLIO, 2019), 285.  
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the law generated heavy controversy and eleven years later this highly contentious law 
was, again, called into question. The Union was mostly free of slavery, with the 
exception of the four border states that still allowed the practice (Missouri, Kentucky, 
Maryland, and Delaware). These states were seen as key to establishing Union success in 
the war and for fear of losing them to the Confederacy, Lincoln’s administration was 
hesitant to issue policy infringing their right to own slaves. The events at Fort Monroe, 
though, began a new policy initiative in regard to runaway slaves.  
The commanding officer at the Virginia fort was Major-General Benjamin F. 
Butler. In the early days of his leadership, Butler was confronted with three runaway 
slaves, Frank Baker, James Townsend, and Shepard Mallory, who had made it past the 
Union lines and into the Fort.6 The trip was a dangerous one for them to take; the three 
men had no way of knowing how they would be received at the camp. The New York 
Times wrote an article about the event, identifying the three men as, “field hands, owned 
by one Colonel Mallory, a resident of this neighborhood, heretofore a lawyer, and now 
engaged in the defense of the soil of Virginia.”7 The article was based on a report from 
Butler who wrote Secretary Stanton about the situation. Both the letter and the 
newspaper article include details about the men’s families, that one had children and a 
wife who were free, and their desire not to serve in the Confederate war effort.8 Mallory 
had, according to the men, planned to move them further south to aid the Confederate 
forces. This posed a serios question for Benjamin Butler as the commanding officer of 
 
6 William R Kelly Jr, “Humanizing the Enslaved of Fort Monroe’s Arc of Freedom,” 2019, 14. 
7 “GENERAL BUTLER AND THE CONTRABAND OF WAR.,” The New York Times, June 2, 1861, sec. 
Archives, https://www.nytimes.com/1861/06/02/archives/general-butler-and-the-contraband-of-
war.html. 
8 Ibid.  
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Fort Monroe. Butler had served in the Massachusetts legislature as a Democrat who did 
not support the abolition of slavery, so his track record did not signify him as someone 
who would sympathize with runaway slaves. While Butler had previously had political 
power, his new position as a military leader (one with little to no prior military 
experience) meant he now had a new avenue to impose his policy beliefs on the 
American people.9 The military leaders of this time, like Butler, had complicated pasts, 
rife with experience and inexperience and this contributed to their inconsistent policy 
decisions. The previous commanding officer of the Fort, Colonel Justin Dimick, had 
followed official United States policy in relation to the Fugitive Slave Act, and returned 
all runaway slaves to their masters, even though said masters were supporting an 
unrecognized and enemy government.10 Though that was the precedent, and the law, 
Butler sought a new course in dealing with these refugees. In a letter to the Lieutenant-
General of the army, Winfield Scott, Butler posed the question of how to handle this 
issue and then proposed his own ideas. Butler wrote, “I determined for the present, and 
until better advised, as these men were very serviceable, and I had great need of labor in 
my quartermaster’s department, to avail myself of their services.”11 This, while posed as 
a question, was more of a report on what had already occurred. Butler went on to ask for 
advice on how to proceed and issued his own opinion about the validity of the Fugitive 
Slave Act for a foreign nation, which the Confederacy claimed to be. In some sense, 
Butler’s actions became immediate and irreversible policy. To allow three former slaves 
 
9 “Butler, Benjamin Franklin,” American History Central, accessed February 10, 2021, 
https://www.americanhistorycentral.com/entries/benjamin-franklin-butler/. 
10 Amy Murrell Taylor, Embattled Freedom Journeys through the Civil War’s Slave Refugee Camps 
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press), 3.  
11 Justin D. Murphy, ed., The American Civil War: Interpreting Documents Through Primary 
Documents, vol. 1 (ABC-CLIO, 2019), 114. 
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into the Union lines as laborers (not runaway slaves) and develop an argument for its 
legality set a precedent for any other military officer to follow. Once the men were 
allowed in the camps as “contrabands,” word spread quickly, and within two months 
there were around 900 former slaves residing at Fort Monroe.12 Once Butler made the 
initial decision, there was no stopping or controlling the influx of people seeking 
freedom from the Confederacy and thus a new policy was born.   
A key point to analyze in this letter is that the arrival of runaway slaves was not a 
new occurrence. The War Department and Lincoln’s cabinet had a chance to determine 
policy to use in these instances and opted not to. This left the decision making wide 
open for interpretation, which, in turn allowed Col. Dimick to refuse the runaway slaves 
and Butler to implement an entirely new system of handling the situation.  
In his letter to Winfield Scott, Butler used persuasive language to explain his 
policy. In the final lines of a second letter following up on the issue, he wrote to the 
Lieutenant-General, “As a political question and a question of humanity can I receive 
the service of a father and mother and not take the children? Of the humanitarian aspect 
I have no doubt; of the political one I have no right to judge.”13 He posed a troubling 
moral dilemma which left little room for arguing in its opposition. Butler used 
persuasive moral arguments intertwined with the argument of military necessity to 
support his decision. It is clear here that there is a question of military necessity, but 
maybe more importantly there is a question of humanity and of public policy. This 
language created a guise of deferment to the political minds of the time in the War 
 
12 Murphy, The American Civil War, vol. 1, 117.  
13 Murphy, The American Civil War, vol. 1, 116.  
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Department, while in reality, Butler had already implemented the policy and 
determined the argument for its use. Butler had allowed the men, women, and children 
to enter into his camp as refugees and laborers and was now only trying to receive the 
government’s blessing for what had already been done, not advice on how to proceed.  
After some time, a response finally reached Butler on the topic of how to address 
the situation. Simon Cameron, the United States Secretary of War, responded to the 
general’s first two letters by acknowledging the predicament at Fort Monroe. Cameron 
stated that he would allow Butler to use runaway slaves for labor but, “the question of 
their final disposition will be reserved for future determination.”14 Cameron, as the one 
who should influence wartime policy in a profound way as the Secretary of War, offered 
no other policy; he allowed Butler to cautiously proceed.  
A few months later, with no clear political solution other than the one proposed 
by Butler, Fort Monroe’s numbers of refugee slaves reached an enormous count as many 
came in by the hundreds. By the end of the war, the number of refugees there was over 
ten thousand.15 Across the Union, other military officials began addressing the issue in 
different ways. In another region, General Irwin McDowell refused runaway slaves 
within his lines and sent them back to their masters. Confusion loomed over the official 
U.S. policy and while Butler continued to allow slaves into his lines based on his own 
policy, it became increasingly difficult to discern what was to be done with the refugees. 
In a third letter to Simon Cameron Butler asked plainly, “Are these men, women, and 
children, slaves? Are they free?” He further posed the reasoning that, “If property, do 
 
14 Murphy, The American Civil War, vol. 1, 116. 
15 Kelly, “Humanizing the Enslaved of Fort Monroe’s Arc of Freedom,” 2019, 14. 
  18 
 
  
they not become the property of the salvors? But we, their salvors, do not need and will 
not hold such property, and will assume no such ownership. Has not, therefore, all 
proprietary relation ceased?”16 Butler went so far as to explain that while he was willing 
to enforce official United States policy, he was not sure what the policy was, and if left to 
his own decision making, would do something entirely different. This lack of political 
and military coordination is the exact environment in which the policy decisions ceased 
to form within the Lincoln administration and came within the jurisdiction of the 
military officials themselves. While Simon Cameron and others deliberated on the issue 
and focused on other wartime efforts, those in places like Fort Monroe and across the 
country were making policy decisions based on their own beliefs and the circumstances 
in which they found themselves.  
In August of 1861, nearly four months after Butler created his confiscation and 
contraband policy, Congress issued the First Confiscation Act detailing what was to be 
done with runaway slaves. Section four of the act provided that those who fled into 
Union lines became laborers for the Union and were no longer under the ownership of 
anyone “hostile” to the Union.17 It is in this act that the influences of Butler’s decisions 
are most sharp. His policy to “confiscate” property that fled into Union lines to use 
against the Confederacy was fairly revolutionary and the language he used is reflected in 
the Congressional Act itself. So, Butler’s military decision became official U.S. policy 
within a number of months.  
 
 
16 Murphy, The American Civil War, vol. 1, 117.  
17 Murphy, The American Civil War, vol. 1, 135.  




As has been shown, the slow communication, confusing distribution of power, 
collision of political beliefs and experiences made the commanding officers handling the 
question of slavery respond in a myriad of ways. A key point to note, though, is that 
while these officers were busy answering key policy issues, African American men and 
women, like Baker, Townsend, and Mallory, had to first pose the questions. 
In light of the events taking place at Fort Monroe, newspapers across the country 
were responding to the issue of refugees coming into the Union. Frederick Douglass, a 
former slave himself, had a unique perspective and an unrivaled orator’s ability. He was 
able to reach audiences all over the states and rally support for the war against the 
Confederacy. He was a supporter of the Republican party but was also unafraid to call 
out its timider members when it came to emancipation-related policy. He constantly 
pushed Lincoln to become more radical and bolder in his policy decisions. Douglass’ 
responsiveness to issues of policy facing military officers helped bring these new issues 
to the forefront of the public mind. In the case of Fort Monroe, Douglass helped spread 
the word about the new “contraband” policy and express his support. In a July 1861 
issue of his periodical, Douglass’ Monthly, he shed light on the event. The periodical 
said in reference to the refugees, “Gangs are now doing good service in the cause of the 
Government, and seem the happiest fellows in the world. They work willingly, and claim 
to belong to the regular army. They are no three-month men, and probably do not wish 
un early discharge.”18 Douglass began this issue with a long essay on how it was 
 
18 “The ‘Contraband Goods’ at Fortress Monroe,” Douglass’ Monthly, July 1861, 
http://www.accessible.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/accessible/docButton?AAWhat=doc&AAWhere=9&A
ABeanName=toc1&AANextPage=/printFullDocFromXML.jsp&AACheck=4.1246.9.0.0. 
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important for the government to “accept the aid of the slaves wherever the National 
army is required to march to suppress rebellion, and proclaim freedom and protection 
to men and all colors who will rally to the support of the established Government.”19 So, 
the events of Fort Monroe and General Butler’s burgeoning policy were gaining support 
and noteworthiness.  
 Months after the passage of the Confiscation Act and Butler’s approach was 
acknowledged by the administration, the individuals finding refuge in the camp raised 
policy questions of their own. The way these men and women were treated, categorized, 
and deemed laborers became policy from the bottom up. The refugees in these camps 
would raise questions as they asked to be paid laborers, owners of business, and full 
members of the Union camps (if not the United States itself).20 This is evident in the 
reports from the camps and even in the necessity for later entities like the Contraband 
Relief Commission of Cincinnati or Contraband Relief Association. These groups would 
issue reports on behalf of the refugees on the state of their condition and needs. While 
the formal associations and groups formed later than 1861, the seed of that idea was 
planted with the events at Fort Monroe.21 For example, in the case of William Roscoe 
Davis, who was a former refugee and catalyst for change within the Union camps. He 
fully understood the plight of the African American individual laboring in the camps, 
with no clear place and a newly found and uneasy freedom. Davis had come to Fort 
 
19 “The ‘Contraband Goods’ at Fortress Monroe,” Douglass’ Monthly, July 1861. 
20 Amy Murrell Taylor, Embattled Freedom Journeys through the Civil War’s Slave Refugee Camps 
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, n.d.). 
21 Contrabands’ Relief Commission, Report by the Committee of the Contrabands’ Relief Commission of 
Cincinnati, Ohio : Proposing a Plan for the Occupation and Government of Vacated Territory in the 
Seceded States (Cincinnati [Ohio]: Gazette Steam Printing House, 1863), 
http://link.gale.com/apps/doc/CY0112449652/SABN?u=txshracd2598&sid=zotero&xid=3ecbf6f1. 
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Monroe as a refugee and quickly became an asset to the camp as someone in charge of 
handing out supplies to other refugees.22 He wanted to raise awareness of their situation 
and aid these people in whatever way he could to initiate policy that might affect real 
change. He took an important step when he agreed to work with Lewis C. Lockwood. 
Lockwood was a Northern minister who, upon hearing from Davis and learning more 
about the refugee’s himself, sought to change policy. Together, Lockwood and Davis 
sought to win over the hearts and minds of the public for the contrabands’ benefit. Davis 
traveled throughout the North with Lockwood, speaking to churches and abolitionist 
groups, and raising money to support refugee slaves. The Lincoln administration and 
government had only allowed the “seizing” of the contrabands in the First Confiscation 
Acts. The Lincoln Administration had not yet given word on how specifically these men 
and women would be treated or supported. Lockwood and Davis’ efforts to raise 
awareness for the refugee cause at Ft. Monroe arose out of pure necessity and took the 
place of government funding or policy. There were many accounts that attested to Davis’ 
gifts as a speaker and how well he argued for the cause. In one case, a young African 
American carpenter by the name of John Oliver, was so moved by hearing the words of 
Davis that he wrote, “since I have heard Wm Davis Speak of the condition and 
educational wants of the Slaves who are constantly coming into Fortress Monroe and 
other places… I have felt a desire to go and help teach them.”23 Oliver explained in his 
letter that he knew how slavery impacted an individual and wanted to go to Fort Monroe 
to help as much as he could. It was exactly this sentiment that Davis and Lockwood 
 
22 Arthur P. Davis, “William Roscoe Davis and His Descendants,” Negro History Bulletin, January 1950, 
4.  
23 Amistad Research Center, “William Roscoe Davis,” Amistad Research Center, accessed April 19, 2021, 
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sought to elicit and bolster in the North. At the conclusion of their tour, it was clear 
Davis was a success. In an account written by his grandson, Arthur P. Davis wrote, “The 
mission was successful… an appreciable amount of money and clothes came to Fortress 
Monroe as a result of my grandfather’s efforts in the North.”24 Here, I would argue, the 
efforts of individuals like Davis and Lockwood, coupled with that of more organized 
efforts from the AMA or later Contraband relief associations, meant all the difference for 
African American refugees. Davis’ Northern tour occurred in the Fall of 1861, and while 
the 1st Confiscation Act had been issued in August, questions of refugee rights and status 
were still up in the air. The government had allowed Butler’s policy to stand, but they 
had taken no further steps to bring the refugees into Union society or support their new 
place in the camps. So, throughout 1861 policy regarding support, funding and 
recognition for the freedom and security of these African American refugees in labor 
camps, were open to pioneering.   
 A broader effect of Davis’ work was the expansion of support for emancipation. In 
one account, an onlooker remembered how Davis had “considered the present a pledge 
of the future – the virtual emancipation of fifteen or eighteen hundred, the promise of 
the emancipation of four million. The Lord works from little to great.”25 William Roscoe 
Davis rose from the definition of powerless; Davis was a slave who through his sheer will 
and luck wound up a contraband at Fort Monroe. His spontaneous cooperation with 
Lockwood and engagement with Butler’s policy was remarkable. His efforts to gain base 
rights for the refugees had larger implications for abolition. Without those like Davis 
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and Lockwood, the policy of quasi-free contrabands, begun by Butler in Virginia, would 
not have seen such success.  
Frémont’s Proclamation 
Just days after the First Confiscation Act was passed, a commander by the name 
of John C. Frémont issued policy orders of his own in the Western Theater of the war in 
Missouri. The commanding general had made an unsuccessful bid for the presidency in 
1856 and the Republican politician suddenly found himself in a place of power. In a 
sweeping proclamation issued from the Headquarters of the Western Department, 
Frémont took authority into his own hands and sought to not only free slaves living in 
Missouri but impose martial law.  
 Frémont was the commander of forces in the Western theater of the war that had 
seen increased fighting in the weeks leading up to the proclamation. He came up with a 
solution for the military issues facing Missouri with a politically charged response. In 
the order he remarked, “circumstances, in my judgment, of sufficient urgency render it 
necessary that the commanding general of this department should assume the 
administrative powers of the State.”26 This was the commander’s opening line of the 
proclamation, which asserted from the first moment possible that he has assumed 
control based on his own belief in his right to power. His language is charged with 
passion and authority. The proclamation further stated, “In order, therefore, to suppress 
disorder, to maintain as far as now practicable the public peace, and to give security and 
protection to the persons and property of loyal citizens, I do hereby extend and declare 
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established martial law throughout the State of Missouri.”27 In order to understand the 
significance of this order it is necessary to understand the nature of martial law which is 
an application of law directly from a military power occupying a certain area.28 This 
meant that in addition to the power already in the hands of the major general, he was 
now taking more power from whatever local law enforcement or groups there were and 
vesting it in his own military authority. In light of the strained relationship between 
Union states, the government, and the people, it is no wonder President Lincoln did not 
appreciate this breach of power. Frémont’s argument for issuing the proclamation 
resided in his own belief that he was justified to make military, and thus public, policy as 
a commanding officer, as was made clear through his reference to his “judgment” and 
duty to Missouri. This was the foundational mentality for many officers in the army 
Lincoln contended with. These men believed they had a right to assert authority, and in 
some cases did have the right, and in turn created policy.    
The policy dynamics that came out of the proclamation were multifold. The 
emerging problem with fighting a war on American soil was that the commanders in 
making military related policy decisions, in turn, made direct political and social policies 
as well. In the example of this proclamation Frémont stated, “the property, real and 
personal, of all persons in the State of Missouri who shall take up arms against the 
United States, or who shall be directly proven to have taken an active part with their 
enemies in the field, is declared to be confiscated to the public use, and their slaves, if 
any they have, are hereby declared freemen.”29 The language Frémont used is again 
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charged with his bold belief in his own authority. This is social policy disguised as 
military policy. While apprehending those who were causing trouble for Union soldiers 
in Missouri and confiscating property were well within his jurisdiction as a commanding 
officer, freeing slaves was not. In the Confiscation Act and as Butler modeled, slaves 
could be confiscated and used as laborers by the Union army. They were, in essence, 
exchanging one ownership for another. The language of the First Confiscation Act did 
not decree runaway slaves as free men, but rather confiscated laborers. This 
proclamation named these people “freemen” in a complete change of policy.  
Frémont’s policy had significant ramifications because of the aforementioned, 
but also because Missouri was a border state and still allowed slavery. The status of the 
border states was a constant concern for President Lincoln; if just one other state left 
the Union to join the Confederacy, military forces would be weakened, and the general 
defense of the Union would be made strategically more difficult. So, while some rejoiced 
over the proclamation, President Lincoln was immediately concerned about the effects 
such a proclamation would have on Union war efforts. In a response letter to Frémont, 
Lincoln wrote, “your proclamation of August 30th gave me some anxiety.”30 He went on 
to explain how this proclamation and the freeing of slaves could lead to the secession of 
border states. He also included a copy of the First Confiscation Act in the letter and 
asked Frémont to alter his proclamation to align with the current policy and law. This 
letter revealed Lincoln’s unease at the policy determination of his commanding officers. 
He was anxious and concerned by the order and wholly disagreed with the extreme 
measures Frémont had taken.  
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Lincoln further made his stance clear in a letter to Senator Orville H. Browning, 
who challenged his revocation of Frémont’s proclamation. Lincoln wrote, “Fremont’s 
proclamation, as to confiscation of property, and the liberation of slaves, is purely 
political, and not within the range of military law, or necessity.”31 This letter illustrated 
perfectly the breakdown in policy responsibility during the Civil War. Lincoln argued it 
was not within Frémont’s authority to issue such a proclamation and called it “purely 
political.” And yet, it could be argued, questions of military policy and pure politics were 
too intertwined to be answered separately at this time. As a commanding officer, 
Frémont thought he had the right to do what he believed was necessary to maintain 
peace and control in Missouri. He saw an opportunity to cripple the enemy by 
confiscating their property and taking strong measures against Confederate forces 
through martial law. Further, it might be also “purely political” not to take important 
wartime measures solely to preserve delicate political standing with the border states 
and within Congress. So, Lincoln’s condemnation of the proclamation on grounds it was 
“purely political” seems to lack significant support. He goes on in this letter to state 
about the slaves in Missouri that, “If the General needs them, he can seize them, and use 
them; but when the need is past, it is not for him to fix their permanent future 
condition.”32 Lincoln explained it is no longer the government of the United States if one 
general, or even a president, could make decisions that would forever change property 
ownership through a proclamation. That being said, Lincoln did in fact do exactly that 
less than a year later with his Emancipation Proclamation.  
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In conclusion, Frémont’s proclamation was enormously significant. It was a test 
of the Lincoln administration and their ability to control policy in a centralized way. It 
forced Lincoln to respond, at least publicly, that he was not going to side with 
emancipation. The proclamation was read widely by the whole country; everyone within 
the Union who heard of it was forced to consider one side or the other. Frémont took a 
bold public stance that would later trickle down through policy decisions. It had direct 
effects on not just the military efforts of the Union, but the politics of the day. 
A year later Congress approved the Second Confiscation Act which proved a 
major turning point in the official view of former slaves. Using language that originated 
with Benjamin Butler and was perpetuated by John C. Frémont, Congress referred to 
the runaway slaves and refugees as “contraband.” In the legislation they wrote into law 
an answer to the question posed by officials, soldiers, and free men themselves. The bill 
stated that anyone who was found to be committing treason against the United States 
would have his slaves “made free.”33 This was a significant change from the First 
Confiscation Act which only allowed for the taking of the “property” for Union use, 
employing ambiguous language. These refugees were given the distinct classification of 
“free” instead of a confiscated laborer. This shows a major change in the legislatures and 
administration’s view of these men and women. The administration and Congress were 
able to watch these commanding officers like Butler, Frémont, and then ordinary 
citizens like Davis and Lockwood, to spread the word about refugee camps. After 
gauging public response to these policies and their relative success, the U.S. government 
could proceed with these policies. The language of these acts and the clear shift (albeit 
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gradual) of the official response to the former slaves can be attributed to the work of 
these individuals.  
The Emancipation Proclamation 
One of the most well-known aspects of President Lincoln’s legacy is his 
Emancipation Proclamation. Following his response to Frémont’s proclamation and 
other officer-driven policy, it can almost seem surprising that he issued his landmark 
policy announcement on freeing slaves. It is important now to take a moment and 
analyze the administration’s views of the events occurring in the time between the 
outbreak of the war and 1863.  
In July of 1862, at about the same time that Congress passed the Second 
Confiscation Act, President Lincoln submitted his first draft of the Emancipation 
Proclamation to the cabinet.34 This is significant because as the events of the war 
progressed and actions of the military commanders escalated, Lincoln was changing his 
mind on policy relating to slavery in America. In this draft Lincoln stated:  
“I, as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, do order and declare that 
on the first day of January in the year of Our Lord one thousand, eight hundred and sixty-three, all 
persons held as slaves within any state or states, wherein the constitutional authority of the United States 
shall not then be practically recognized, submitted to, and maintained, shall then, thenceforward, and 
forever, be free.”35 
The significance of this draft was immense. President Lincoln had debated 
measures such as compensated emancipation, relocation of slaves to colonies, and 
maintaining the institution to maintain peace. But, by July 1862, the president had 
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decided his course of action and now only awaited a time to issue the proclamation. 
President Lincoln was waiting for a military victory to accompany the announcement. 
That time came in September of 1862 and he was finally able to issue his proclamation a 
few months later in January of 1863. In his proclamation he quotes his original draft, 
written that July, and proclaimed all slaves outside the Union were forever free.36  
In Conclusion 
 President Lincoln and the U.S. Congress were plagued with new policy initiatives 
arising from all over the country on the topic of slavery in the early years of the war. 
From the first shots fired at Ft. Sumter to the Emancipation Proclamation itself, the 
traditional avenues of policy formulation were influenced by the military officials in the 
field. In some cases, these decisions were even driven by civilians like those at Ft. 
Monroe. It is clear through the trial and error of military generals issuing policy that 
their decisions played a role in what would become official United States policy on 
slavery. From the bold actions to allow refugee slaves into Union lines to the 
announcement of emancipation, grass-roots policy influenced what President Lincoln 
and Congress were able to accomplish and adopt. While these leaders were extremely 
influential and effective in issuing policy on slavery and the position of African 
Americans in the Union, they would not stop there.  
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“Men in earnest don’t fight with one hand, when they might fight with two, and a man 
drowning would not refuse to be saved even by a colored hand.” 
Frederick Douglass, September 1861 
 While the American government was still contemplating how to address the 
policies regarding refugee slaves, Frederick Douglass and many others were pushing the 
idea of enlisting Black men in the Union army. As early as 1861 Douglass’s calls for 
adding Black troops to the army were heard in the deep South by Union officers and 
equally ignored by Union government officials. While the question of abolition, the legal 
status of refugee slaves, and how to employ them stood in the balance, the idea of 
enlistment received growing attention. This was an area in which it is important to note 
the de-centralization of public policy. Northern press and civilian activists helped play 
an important role in the call to support the policy of enlistment that was unsupported by 
the government. While the U.S. government debated the nature of “confiscated 
property,” two military generals were fighting to integrate Black refugees and free men 
into the Union army. General David Hunter and General John W. Phelps were both 
known abolitionists and commanded, respectively, Union forces along the coast of 
South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida and the Department of the Gulf.37 In 1862, around 
the same time Frémont had issued his orders, these generals began a policy campaign of 
their own; they wished to include Black men in the Union forces. The actual 
incorporation of these troops, legally, into the Union army though, took years.  
 
37 Ira Berlin, Joseph P. Reidy, and Leslie S. Rowland, eds., Freedom a Documentary History of 
Emancipation 1861-1867, The Black Military Experience, II (Cambridge University Press, 1982), 6. 
 
  31 
 
  
Lincoln’s Policy  
 To understand what the war generals, civilians, and former slaves themselves 
were fighting against, it is key to know where the Lincoln Administration stood on the 
matter. President Lincoln began his trudge toward emancipating the slaves held in 
Confederate lands in mid 1862. As previously referenced, he introduced his cabinet to 
the idea in July and waited for a military success to accompany the message. This 
opportunity appeared with the repulsion of Confederate forces at Antietam. Following 
this battle, and the announcement of the Second Confiscation Act, Lincoln was able to 
announce his plan for emancipation. Earlier in April of 1862, Lincoln signed the act 
abolishing slavery in the District of Columbia. This act, almost entirely carried by 
Republicans, was a small but important piece of Lincoln’s policy toward slavery.  
It was clear, though, that abolition only in Washington D.C. would not be enough 
for abolitionists and African Americans and they called for a greater policy stance. One 
of the areas where this became especially visible was a push by some to include Black 
individuals in the Union army. In a letter from a former slave Garland H. White to 
Secretary of War Edwin Stanton in May of 1862 it is clear there was support amid 
civilians for Black enlistment. White wrote, “I am now a minister, & am called upon By 
my people to tender your Hon thir willingness to serve as soldiers in the southern parts 
during the summer season or longer if required.”38 Garland H. White is just one 
example of the brave men who volunteered to serve in the Union army well before the 
government had allowed it. While it would be incorrect to assume the entire North, or 
the entire Union, was ready for Black enlistment, it is true that the tide of popular 
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sentiment was changing. In an explosive summer on the topic of Black enlistment, just a 
few months later, Hunter began in earnest his freeing and arming of slaves throughout 
the South in the hope of making soldiers of the individuals. The Second Confiscation Act 
was then passed in July along with an amended Militia Act. Congress, after the events at 
Fort Monroe and the effects of the First Confiscation Act, sought to formally legalize the 
recruitment of Black men into the Union army for labor purposes.  The updated Militia 
Act stated that it was legal for the president to “receive into the service of the United 
States, for the purpose of constructing entrenchments, or perming camp service, or any 
other labor…persons of African descent.” The act went a step further, in connection to 
the Second Confiscation Act stating, “when any man or boy of African descent who by 
the laws of any State shall owe service or labor to any person who, during the present 
rebellion has levied war or has borne arms against the United States… shall forever 
thereafter be free.”39 This coupled with the Second Confiscation Act was immensely 
significant. The act provided a clause to free any mother, wife or child of said men. This 
piece of legislation also provided ten dollars a month, a single ration and allowance for 
clothing to the men. This clarified some of the lingering confusion about what to do with 
refugees and former slaves, as previously explained, but left the case for enlisting these 
men as soldiers closed. While these steps proved vital in the slow move toward full 
enlistment, it was not enough for many abolitionists, Republicans and military leaders.  
The Press Calls for Enlistment  
 As military leaders began to force the question of enlistment, the press and 
certain civilians like Garland H. White supported the effort as well. A vital member of 
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this story, who neither served in official political roles or military roles, was Frederick 
Douglass. Aware of Douglass and his newspaper, Douglass' Monthly, President Lincoln 
invited the abolitionist to the White House three times to discuss his views.40 Douglass 
wanted immediate emancipation and believed fully in the abilities of Black individuals 
to serve, not only in the Union army, but as thriving American citizens.41 Horace Greeley 
also influenced the way the people interpreted and understood policy though his New 
York Tribune. Another significant newspaper outlet in affecting policy surrounding 
slavery was the Weekly Angl0-African. In an article published in early March 1862 
reporter George E. Stephens, who also served as a cook for a lieutenant-general, wrote of 
the conditions of the refugees. He explained their appearance and acceptance as 
contrabands (per Butler’s policy) but supplied an inside look into the mindset of a 
laborer with no chance of being accepted as a soldier. Stephens wrote, “the black man 
under the incentives of Free labor, pay, and freedom, goes blithely and gaily to his task; 
while the white man under the repulsiveness of forced labor and no pay, lounges about 
and skulks sulkily away.”42 He went on to write that the men were clothed, fed, housed, 
and paid a small amount for their labor and in light of those comforts, “his pay is nearly 
as good as the enlisted soldier.”43 This newspaper, written and distributed by African 
Americans living across the country, provided an inside look at the sentiment of the 
time. In March of 1862 (when this was written in Maryland) tensions rose between the 
government and some of the military officials, like General David Hunter and Phelps, 
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who wanted these men for more than laborers. The official change in the Militia Act and 
Second Confiscation Act would not become policy for another few months. This camp, 
while seemingly small in scale, is just one of many camps that employed Black men and 
refugees for compensated work before it was official policy. White soldiers saw these 
refugees completing tasks well and with zeal and it provided an environment where a 
policy of Black enlistment would thrive, or at least survive. Stephens wrote, “these 30 or 
40 men do more in the same space of time than a hundred white men – thus reversing 
the order of things.”44 This was information that would bolster the policy initiative and 
give validity to the idea of Black Union soldiers. It was spontaneous cooperation of 
groups with varied motives reaching for the same goal. The combination of press 
attention and new initiatives in military camps created an environment in which public 
policy was created, implemented, and evaluated, all without official United States 
recognition or influence.  
General Hunter’s Forces 
 On May 9, 1862, General Hunter issued a proclamation that originated solely 
from his policy belief and was at odds with the views of Congress and the 
Administration. In the proclamation Hunter said, “Slavery and martial law in a free 
country are altogether incompatible; the persons in these three States–Georgia, Florida 
and South Carolina–heretofore held as slaves, are therefore declared forever free.”45 
Similar to Frémont, Hunter tried to use martial law as a way to get what he wanted 
accomplished. Again, it is clear military necessity and public policy are utterly 
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intertwined. Hunter made his proclamation in the name military strategy, but he was 
addressing a situation that was politically charged. In this policy, though, Hunter went 
further than Frémont in declaring the slaves free and determining their fitness to serve 
in the Union forces. President Lincoln responded swiftly to this proclamation and made 
it clear that if slaves were to be declared free in any capacity it would be “under my 
responsibility, [which] I reserve to myself, and which I cannot feel justified in leaving to 
the decision of commanders in the field.”46 Lincoln made it clear he was not in favor of 
having his generals determine public policy. And yet, Hunter’s proclamation was far 
reaching and found its way to the floor of Congress.47 On June 14th Congress responded 
by passing a joint resolution opposing Hunter. The House of Representatives met to 
pass an inquiry into Hunter’s action in the Southern region. The resolution stated 
plainly that the War Department had not given him the authorization to raise companies 
of “fugitive or captive slaves.”48 The resolution goes further to stipulate that while the 
War Department and Lincoln Administration did furnish Hunter with arms, they were 
not meant to be used by “those slaves.”49 The purpose of this resolution was for 
Congress to assert its authority over a situation it did not ordain nor politically align 
with. It is this precise reasoning that makes Hunter’s testing environment for the 
enlistment of Black soldiers all the more interesting. He was clearly at odds with the 
War Department, so much so that they demanded he respond to the issued resolution 
with a full report of his actions. His policy initiative had captured the attention of the 
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nation’s policy makers; it clearly had influence and was important enough that 
Congress, along with Lincoln himself, wrote to address it. While they rejected it at the 
time, his steps forward for enlistment provided a platform for the administration to base 
their later decisions on.  
Phelps’s Call for Emancipation and Enlistment 
 In a similar way, General Phelps, a commanding officer below Benjamin Butler, 
sought to arm refugee slaves in the summer of 1862. The Commanding General is yet 
another example of a military officer who brought his pre-existing beliefs into policy 
decisions (both socially and militarily) during this time. Phelps served in the 
Department of the Gulf, which Benjamin Butler had taken command of after his 
departure from Ft. Monroe. New Orleans was captured by Union forces in April of 1862, 
opening up an entirely new region to Northern troops that was once strictly under 
Southern control. Somewhat surprisingly, Butler’s reaction was complex and at times at 
odds with the enlistment of Black soldiers from the newly captured region, yet another 
example of his complexity of character. General Phelps, though, saw the capture of New 
Orleans as a way to begin his plan for an African American presence in the Union army 
to undermine the Southern forces. The location of New Orleans made this venture a 
unique issue, because it was so far from Washington, D.C. and nestled deep within 
Confederate territory. This meant that it would take a long time for word to reach the 
Lincoln Administration about anything happening in Louisiana and travel between the 
two places would be precarious. It also meant that the Union army would need to bulk 
up its forces in order to maintain a strong military upper hand. These factors led to the 
opening Phelps found to recruit Black soldiers.  
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 Beginning earlier in December 1861, Phelps publicly encouraged refugee slaves to 
join the Union soldiers in Southern Louisiana. With the surrounding areas, including 
New Orleans, still under Confederate control, Phelps’ call became even more charged as 
runaway slaves found refuge within his lines. By the following May, Phelps had gathered 
many refugee slaves and had encouraged a spirit of resistance among his soldiers to the 
institution of slavery. By the following June, Phelps was urging the president himself to 
adopt policy intended for enlistment and abolition. Around this time Butler was also 
discouraging Phelps’s insubordination. Butler’s motivation seemed at odds with his 
previous policy on confiscation, but it is possible he either wanted to enlist Black 
soldiers on his own, or did not want to stray from War Department orders.  
The tension between the lack of official U.S. policy and confusion in the minds of 
military leaders came to a head in June 1862. In a series of correspondences between 
General Phelps, Butler, and the War Department it is clear there was a struggle to 
understand and implement policy regarding what to do about not only refugee slaves, 
but the potential to enlist them in the army. With the military success in Louisiana, it 
became clear to plantation owners in the area they would soon be overrun with Union 
power. An account reached General Phelps that a well-known plantation owner, Mr. 
Lablanche, had given his slaves the option of “leaving before sundown or receiving fifty 
lashes.”50 After these individuals made it to the Union Camp Parapet, others arrived and 
soon the camp had received around 150 refugee slaves. Phelps, in his letter to his 
superiors, wrote that Lablanche justified sending his slaves away, stating, “Yankees are 
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king here now, and that they [slaves] must go to their kind for food and shelter.”51 
General Phelps followed that quote with a long explanation of the humanitarian 
injustice that slavery brought about and its opposition to the spirit of the United States 
Constitution. He expressed pity and confusion as to how to proceed with the refugees 
who had nothing and nowhere to go.  
Following a detailed explanation of his moral beliefs, General Phelps suggested a 
radical policy initiative. In reference to the refugee African Americans currently at Camp 
Parapet, Phelps wrote, “fifty regiments might be raised among them at once, which 
could be employed in this climate to preserve order… an army partly of blacks would 
naturally operate in favor of freedom and against those influences which at present most 
endanger our liberties.”52 Brigadier General Phelps was confident in his ability to arm 
the newly escaped slaves and train them as soldiers. He boldly suggested this enlistment 
policy and intertwined it with the importance of permanent abolition and justice.  
 In response to the multi-page policy suggestions given by Phelps, his superior 
officer Benjamin Butler responded in a demure way to the War Department. Butler 
wrote, “General Phelps, I believe, intends making this a test case for the policy of the 
government.”53 Butler saw clearly that Phelps had the passion, ability and intention to 
raise Black soldiers and responded by deferring to the War Department. In an 
interesting rhetorical patter, he profusely asked for guidance and promoted his 
willingness to listen to the Department’s wishes, advice and policies. Throughout his 
letter, though, he also wrote his own ideas on the policy and situation. Butler wrote, “I 
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respect his [Phelps] honest sincerity of opinion, but I am a soldier, bound to carry out 
the wishes of my government so long as I hold its commission, and I understand that 
policy to be the one I am pursuing.”54 His language here resembles that of his earlier 
letters to the War Department regarding the situation at Fort Monroe. In his original 
letter written from Fort Monroe, he wrote paragraphs about the morality of how to 
handle the refugees and the question of humane treatment. It is interesting how now he 
demurely refers to himself as simply a soldier wishing to pursue the direction of his 
governing leaders; where was this reserved attitude when he boldly set forth to establish 
his precedent-setting “contraband” policy? While Phelps’ letter to the Department was 
certainly more in-depth regarding his specific policy suggestions, General Butler shared 
similar moral outlooks and impassioned beliefs about treatment of refugee slaves. 
This exchange of correspondences is an interesting study in the evolving and 
sensitive nature of grassroots policy development. It seems Butler needed to balance his 
own beliefs with the wishes of the department in order to avoid a fate similar to Frémont 
or others who had lost their posts for asserting their opinions. It is also interesting to 
note his suggestion that Phelps intended to use this as a “test case” for government 
policy, as that is precisely what he did at Fort Monroe and what Phelps would later go on 
to do.  
 In July of 1862, just weeks after this exchange took place, General Phelps took 
matters into his own hands and created five companies of African American troops. This 
produced contention between Butler and Phelps yet again, with Butler wanting his 
policy of confiscation and contraband to win out. Phelps, though, did not want these 
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men as laborers, but rather as soldiers. He also sought out runaway slaves as well as free 
Black men, another difference between the two officers’ policies. This is yet another 
example of the entanglements of military and social policy. While it was within Phelps’ 
jurisdiction to raise companies, much needed at that moment, it was not War 
Department policy for him to include Black soldiers. Phelps argued the use of former 
slaves against their masters in the heart of the South would lay the foundation for a 
strong military counter to Confederate forces. The other consequence of this, though, 
was the question of whether these people were “contrabands” still, soldiers or 
“freemen.”55 This question would be one that plagued the Union army until 1863 when 
the Emancipation Proclamation finally “allowed” the enlistment of Black soldiers.  
 It is here an argument can be made for the influence of those Generals like John 
Phelps and David Hunter. They set policy in motion that was both before their time and 
outside of the will of Congress or the Lincoln administration. While there might have 
been hope in parts of the government for Black enlistment, it gained little traction in the 
early years of the war. The bold actions of these generals created a test environment for 
what would “officially” come to pass with the Emancipation Proclamation. It is clear 
from the surviving correspondences that the War Department, cabinet, and the 
President himself knew what was happening in the Gulf region as well as in South 
Carolina, Georgia, and Virginia. In the case of General Phelps, they did not intervene, 
but rather watched the events play out awaiting their result. In the case of Hunter, their 
intervention only meant more widespread knowledge of the occurrence. This could have 
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provided encouragement to abolitionists in the North and gotten people used to the idea 
of Black soldiers.  
 In either case, the actions of General Phelps, Hunter and Butler exemplify the 
military leaders’ ability to seize a political moment through military means. They 
wielded power within their regions in the army and were able to translate that into 
accomplishing public policy initiatives in some of the most profound ways yet to be seen 
in the war. Their actions set the stage for the eventual adoption of the policy of 
recruiting Black soldiers for the army.  
The 54th Massachusetts 
 Robert Gould Shaw was an immensely significant player in the events leading up 
to Black enlistment in the Union army. As the son of ardent abolitionists, he was hand-
chosen to be the first commander of the first official Black company: the 54th 
Massachusetts infantry.56 This regiment was to be the example for which other “colored 
regiments” would be modeled and all of America was tracking their progress. In his 
Emancipation Proclamation, Lincoln clearly stated of the newly freed slaves that they 
would be “received into the armed service of the United States to garrison forts, 
positions, stations, and other places, and to man vessels of all sorts in said service.”57 
This was the culmination of the efforts of so many of the war generals and civilians alike.  
 The 54th Massachusetts was one of the first to see the reward of the 
proclamation’s policy. Though its creation was rooted in official U.S. directives, there 
were leaders like Shaw whose actions generated policy that would remain for the rest of 
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the war. While the government had deemed these men worthy of the army, there were 
still many Northern citizens and soldiers who were against the idea of Black soldiers in 
the armed services. Following Frémont’s proclamation, Lincoln wrote, “on the news of 
Gen. Fremont having actually issued deeds of manumission, a whole company of our 
Volunteers threw down their arms and disbanded.”58 At the idea of the abolition of 
slavery in Kentucky (a border state still within the Union) an entire company refused to 
fight in the war. While much had evolved since the previous year and Frémont’s 
proclamation, it was precisely this sentiment, still lingering in some places, that General 
Robert Gould Shaw and the soldiers were facing.  
 Even within the leadership of these new companies, though, there were different 
policies as to how to lead the soldiers. As per historic precedent, the U.S. government 
was not as involved in the policy generation, but rather an onlooker of the final result; 
the War Department governed these generals with loose reigns. Shaw ran his camp with 
order and as much fairness as possible. His soldiers were trained, fed, clothed and ready 
for battle when they were called to Fort Wagner in the summer of 1863. The 54th 
Massachusetts was sent to join the 2nd South Carolina in Georgia for active duty. The 2nd 
South Carolina Volunteer regiment was led by Colonel James Montgomery who pursued 
an entirely different policy than Shaw had with the 54th. Shaw wrote to his wife what he 
thought about Montgomery’s leadership style and the issues he observed with the 
colonel’s actions. Montgomery ordered two regiments to destroy Darien, a small town in 
Georgia, with little to no regard for the few “defenseless” remaining inhabitants or the 
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deserted “beautiful little town.”59 Shaw wrestled with the order as it was not the War 
Department’s policy to utterly decimate towns unnecessarily. Montgomery justified the 
destruction by stating, “We are outlawed and therefore not bound by the rules of regular 
warfare.” This reasoning was a policy of its own, though, because in the eyes of the 
United States government, they were not the outlaws, even though they treaded on 
Confederate land. Shaw recognized another issue with this policy and wrote, “I am not 
sure that it will not harm very much the reputation of black troops and of those 
connected with them.”60 Shaw saw clearly that the decisions of the military leaders 
around him, including himself, would influence policy regarding Black enlistment. He 
knew this experiment could be ended as quickly as it had begun by the administration 
and feared the actions of the regiment’s leaders could bring about that outcome. That 
being said, policy (whether one of pure Union war strategy or one of guerrilla warfare) 
generated by officials on the ground, influenced the success of companies of Black 
troops.  
 In the end, Shaw’s decision to treat the Black soldiers as worthy of their 
assignment proved an invaluable measure in driving policy. On July 18th, 1863 Shaw led 
his men into a battle that proved to set the men up as the example for all others. 
Dissimilar from Montgomery’s style, Shaw held his men to a standard set for the white 
soldiers. He did not find it suitable for them to burn towns or attack defenseless 
positions. Above all, he wanted to give these men a chance to prove themselves in battle; 
on July 18th he got that chance. James Henry Gooding was a soldier in the 54th 
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Massachusetts who wrote of his time in the regiment to the New Bedford Mercury 
newspaper. The men faced an enormous task in defeating the almost impenetrable 
beach position the Confederate forces held, but Shaw wanted his men to have a chance 
to fight. In two engagements the 54th proved their might. Gooding wrote of the first 
skirmish, “It is not for us to blow our own horn; but when a regiment of white men gave 
us three cheers as we were passing them, it shows that we did our duty as men should.”61 
Gooding makes clear that whatever prejudices did exist, Shaw’s policy to set the 54th up 
as equals to the white forces in skill and bravery succeeded. The next battle, though, 
proved more costly than the previous. Another soldier in the 54th who recounted his 
experience, Lewis Douglass, was the son of the renowned Frederick Douglass. His 
account of the assault on Fort Wagner revealed the intense bombardment the men 
experienced. Douglass wrote to the woman who would be his wife, “This regiment has 
established its reputation as a fighting regiment not a man flinched, though it was a 
trying time… I wish we had a hundred thousand colored troops we would put an end to 
this war.”62 The men of the 54th experienced unrelenting shelling on the beach and 
found themselves attacking the Confederate position in vain. In the midst of the fight, 
Colonel Robert Gould Shaw fell alongside his men. Gooding wrote of this experience, 
“When the men saw their gallant leader fall, they made a desperate effort to get him 
out.”63 Amid the terror, the regiment felt deep loyalty to Shaw. They had worked 
together in what were incredibly difficult odds, and Shaw had given his life in the 
process.  
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 Fort Wagner was a key moment in the struggle to establish Black men as capable 
soldiers. Those that lived in the Union were by no means all abolitionists; many in the 
North did not agree with racial equality even if some did advocate for the abolition of 
slavery. Shaw led his men and established policy that they should be trained and treated 
like white soldiers (or as similarly as they could under the circumstances). He himself 
led them into battle knowing the significant odds against them but also knowing the 
importance of the moment. Shaw understood that the 54th was similar to the test 
environments of Hunter and Phelps; the actions of the men in the 54th would be 
recorded and looked upon by the entire nation. The bravery of the soldiers and the 
leadership of Shaw set them apart as an exemplary regiment. 
 The 54th Massachusetts, 2nd South Carolina and many other regiments would not 
have been possible without the policy initiatives begun by Phelps, Hunter, and Shaw. It 
was the constant pushing of boundaries and defying of power that allowed for this end 
result. As previously shown, President Lincoln had to cater to certain groups in order to 
maintain the Union. If there had been no urgency to enlist Black soldiers, or test 
environments that proved it to be a success, who knows how long it would talk to be 
made official policy.    
In Conclusion  
The question of Black enlistment in the Union military proved to be grassroots 
driven. While Lincoln gave the final seal of approval, he did so based off of the results of 
trial situations. Although these testing environments were not pre-approved, official 
government response depended on them to issue final policy. Without the efforts of 
civilians like Douglass and White or military generals like Phelps, Hunter and Shaw, 
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Lincoln would have nothing but political suggestion to base his policy on. In addition, he 
had given no clear word to the public that he would support such a policy if in fact it was 
proposed. So, these test environments created by Black men and the politics of local 
generals created a successful platform for African Americans to prove to the Union they 
should be allowed to fight. The bravery and sacrifice of the 54th Massachusetts proved to 
many that these men were ready for battle. These scattered environments with these 
different leaders created a mosaic of examples to support the enlistment of Black 
soldiers. 
  




“I can make the march and make Georgia howl.” 
William T. Sherman October 9th, 1864 
 While there were efforts aimed directly at policy reform for Black Americans, 
there is a nuanced policy area that included unintentional reform. Some leaders in this 
story did not intend to create political or social change for Black Americans, but their 
actions led to just that. By looking at Sherman’s March to the Sea, freedom along his 
march and the policy of living off the land, it will become clear that these grassroots 
initiatives had an impact on policy. 
Top Generals Take on Policy 
 William T. Sherman and General Ulysses S. Grant were the main military leaders 
for the Union during the last years of the war. When Grant took over the military war 
effort, the Union strategy shifted with his new ideas and ways to wage war; Grant met 
Robert E. Lee head on in aggression and threw all the resources he had at the war. 
Sherman worked closely with Grant and together they began to weld together a policy 
that would define the end of the war. Even President Lincoln was willing to defer to 
Grant in military matters. He wrote in one letter after Grant pursued a different course 
than one Lincoln proposed, “you were right, and I was wrong.”64 While the military 
policy was shaped clearly by the two men, both stated their wishes to stay out of public 
debate. Grant in response to the aforementioned letter from Lincoln shifted to the topic 
of arming Black soldiers: “I would do this whether the arming of the negro seemed to me 
a wise policy or not, because it is an order that I am bound to obey and do not feel that 
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in my position I have a right to question any policy of the Government.”65 While he went 
on to say that he did, in fact, believe this was sound policy, this is important in 
understanding how Grant desired to defer to the government for policy issues. Sherman 
also made it clear from the outset he was not in a position to generate policy. In a letter 
he responded to an old friend who was demanding the return of his runaway slaves 
Sherman said, “my opinion is, we execute not make the Law, be it of Congress or War.”66 
These two leaders knew their place and at least made it seem that they had no interest in 
shaping policy outside of the war effort. In March of 1864 Ulysses S. Grant was given the 
title of Lieutenant General, an honor that had only fully been bestowed on one other 
person: General George Washington. In a letter commending him on the promotion, 
Sherman wrote of his affection for the general and warned him to “not stay in 
Washington. Halleck is better qualified than you are to stand the buffets of intrigue and 
policy.”67 So, even the two men were reminding each other to stay of out federal policies 
and focus on the war effort. All of these intentions, though, seem to be somewhat 
misplaced when looking at the wide sweeping effects of their military efforts on policy.  
Sherman’s War Mentality 
 In the months following Grant’s promotion, fighting in the Eastern theater 
increased significantly. In April of 1864, Grant told Sherman he had proposed his idea of 
an aggressive, offensive war to President Lincoln who had given him full support. Grant 
wrote to Sherman, “get into the interior of the enemy’s country as far as you can, 
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inflicting all the damage you can against their War resources.”68 This order gave 
Sherman a start to his movements in Georgia. Following a series of military defeats 
there, Sherman was forced into a position that alienated him from his supply line. In a 
moment of spontaneous military strategy, Sherman decided to move his troops across 
Georgia and use the Southern land as his line of supply instead. During the Civil War, 
soldiers relied on rail lines to provide much needed resources and transportation, so 
when a company was cut off from their access, they usually found themselves in a 
precarious situation. Sherman, though, saw an opportunity. He wrote to Grant, “it is 
useless to occupy it [Georgia], but the utter destruction of its roads, houses, and people 
will cripple their military resources.”69 This was significant because it reveals the on-the-
spot thinking that allowed for spontaneous policy to develop. Sherman took the loose 
order from Grant (approved by Lincoln) to wage an all-out war, but decided on a course 
all of his own making.  
In a similar way, in his approach to Atlanta, Sherman issued an order for all of 
the inhabitants to evacuate the city to lessen the civilian casualties. When the 
Confederate officers demanded Sherman take back the order, he responded he would, 
“not revoke my orders, simply because my orders are not designed to meet the 
humanities of the case, but to prepare for the future struggles in which millions yea 
hundreds of millions of Good People outside of Atlanta have a deep interest.”70 This is 
proof that by September, he was so entrenched in his policy that he would be willing to 
do anything to end the war; he did not sympathize with the Confederate demands 
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because he had seen too much destruction and death wreaked throughout the war. He 
had made it clear he was unconcerned with the “humanities” of the situation; which 
would prove both true and untrue in the coming weeks. These were the first steps he 
took in his march to the sea, and as we can tell, his ruthless pursuit of victory was paid 
at a high price.  
March to the Sea 
 Over the course of the next four months, William T. Sherman marched about 
60,000 men across the Confederate state of Georgia. His original plan was to march 
until he could reunite with Union supply lines, but he later decided he would continue 
his march until he reached Savannah. Upon hearing this, other officers in the Union 
army disagreed and even told Grant of their disapproval.71 Nonetheless, Sherman had 
decided on this course and over the next months did not relent. He knew as he set out 
that this path would leave devastation in his wake, and he intended to fulfill his promise 
to “make Georgia howl.”72 The objectives of this mission were supposedly purely 
strategic; Sherman wanted to win Georgia and end with his army in a place that could be 
of assistance to Grant’s forces. That being said, Sherman’s rhetoric and following actions 
hint at a deeper, more personal, attack on the state. While crippling Georgia’s resources 
to weaken the Confederate forces was the main objective, the lengths Sherman’s men 
went to decimate the land and towns they passed went beyond military necessity.  
Many soldiers left first-hand accounts of the brazen behavior of Sherman’s men 
as they made their way to Savannah from Atlanta. They tore up as much railroad as they 
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could, making it impossible for Confederate forces to easily travel through the state and 
also further insulating themselves from Union help. This policy of destroying rail lines 
was around before this march but is best exemplified with Sherman and his men. The 
policy of living off the land had been used in small measures throughout the war; Union 
soldiers would take resources they needed from nearby individuals or from the land and 
would try providing receipts for reimbursement at the conclusion of the war. However, 
no one had yet attempted to traipse through enemy territory living solely off the land 
and what could be found. Sherman set out rules for his men that included not entering 
people’s homes and not burning homes that would swear loyalty to the Union. Soon into 
their march, though, it became clear Sherman had a loose hand on governing his men’s 
actions and with 60,000 troops split into four columns, foraging to survive became the 
pillaging of Southern towns.  
The diary of James M. Connolly, a soldier in Sherman’s company, revealed much 
about what it was like in Georgia at the time. In one account, Connolly came upon “the 
finest one [plantation] I ever saw, but by the time our column has all passed Mr. 
Whitefield won’t have a sweet potato, a pig, chicken, turkey, horse, mule, cow, and 
scarcely a nigger left.”73 They came across plantation homes at the height of Southern 
wealth and destroyed what they found. Anything they needed, they helped themselves to 
from the homes of the Southern upper class. Sherman’s army burned entire towns to the 
ground while taking all the land had to offer from other places. One account stated that 
 
73 Sheehan-Dean, ed., The Civil War, The Final Year, 472. 
  52 
 
  
Sherman said his army was “in perfect health and spirits, with everything they want.”74 
What they could not carry with them, they set on fire.75 
As his army made its way to Savannah, they lived comfortably off of the resources 
of Southern civilians and conquered town after town. Many towns surrendered, or all 
inhabitants had already fled upon hearing word Sherman was coming. While the policy 
discussed between Grant and Lincoln was an offensive war, the policy to destroy 
Southern property in enormous proportions belonged wholly to Sherman.  
Freedom Along the March 
An unintended effect of Sherman’s march was the African Americans who joined 
the march as they made their way through Georgia. Though, Sherman was not himself 
someone who believed wholeheartedly in the abilities of Black Americans to be soldiers. 
Connolly, in a patronizing account remembered how, “before the whole column has 
passed, they pack up their bundles and march along, going, they know not whither, but 
apparently satisfied they are going somewhere toward freedom.”76 Due to the 
Confiscation Acts and the previous year’s Emancipation Proclamation, Sherman was 
obligated to follow the policy of allowing refugees behind Union lines. Policy was not 
clear, though, on the specifics of liberating slaves directly from plantations and having 
them march with the Union army. This seemed to be the dilemma Sherman had to 
ponder as he crossed the state and decided a policy course of his own. As they neared 
Savannah, their final target, a Major in the Union army John Chip Gray, recounted a 
conversation he had with Sherman on this topic. Gray wrote, “the army brought in great 
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droves of cattle, mules, and negroes, the latter of whom he wants to turn over to General 
Saxton, and evidently does not believe in the African as a soldier.”77 Gray was referring 
to General Rufus Saxton, an officer in the army who was an abolitionist and led 
companies of African American soldiers. This conversation is important because it 
reinforces the idea that while Sherman himself was not in favor of Black enlistment, his 
march led to the inadvertent freeing of many slaves.  
There are two important components to consider here: the question of whether 
generals would follow official policy and allow Black men to find refuge behind Union 
lines or going outside of direct policy and free those held in bondage in far reaches of the 
Confederacy. With plantations abandoned by masters, many of these individuals were 
living life in limbo with no clear policy reaching them. While these accounts also 
revealed many white Union soldiers used these newly freed slaves as personal assistants 
or field hands, the Black men and women were freed from their plantations and 
Confederate jurisdiction. Sherman’s march provided Black individuals still in bondage a 
clear way out and into the Union. While this had happened on similar scales at Ft. 
Monroe and in other states, this march took freedom into the heart of Confederate 
territory and helped liberate slaves that had been far from the previous fighting. In 
another eye-witness account, Connolly wrote about how some of the slaves rejoiced 
when Sherman’s men marched through the countryside. In one account Connolly 
recalled an anecdote about how a Black man who was the commissary of the plantation 
wanted to simply lay eyes on Sherman. Connolly wrote, “He was taken to the door of 
Sherman’s tent, and the old man took off his hat, looked at the general a few moments, 
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then bowing respectfully turned and walked off, saying to himself as he walked off 
shaking his head: ‘He’s got the Linkum head.’”78 This story is significant because while 
Sherman’s intent was to destroy the South, not to raise Black individuals out of slavery, 
it is clear he could not do one without the other. In his attempt to pillage and destroy 
Southern wealth, he had to liberate the slaves and allow them to join his army in their 
march. Sherman, whether he wanted to be or not, became a symbol of freedom to some 
of the people newly freed from bondage. The referenced “Linkum head” refers to the 
association people made between Sherman and Lincoln’s emancipation policies. So, 
while Sherman’s march was supposed to be strictly military strategy, it ended up 
bolstering policy that brought Black individuals out of slavery.  
In the months Sherman took his men across Georgia, the War Department and 
other Union army officials had little to no idea how the campaign was going. In 
December Lincoln addressed this in his Annual Message to Congress. Lincoln said, “The 
most remarkable feature in the military operations of the year is General Sherman’s 
attempted march of three hundred miles directly through the insurgent region…The 
result not yet being known, conjecture in regard to it is not here indulged.”79 Lincoln 
was impressed by Sherman’s attempt but he, along with the entirety of the North, did 
not know how Sherman’s troops faired. In light of this, the pillaging, plundering, and 
burning of Georgia was solely under the authority of Sherman. 
In an striking culmination, 20,000 freed African Americans accompanied his 
troops by the time Sherman’s army reached Savannah in January of 1864. As news of 
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Sherman’s military success reached Union officials, so did the news of alleged 
mistreatment of African Americans along the way. Secretary of War Edwin Stanton 
traveled to Savannah to meet with a group of Black ministers and Sherman to hear any 
grievances.80 It is stark to notice that at the outset of the war, some of these men weren’t 
considered citizens and some were even considered property. So, for the Secretary of 
State to travel to Savannah to meet with a group of these African American men and 
hear potential grievances against Sherman was significant. It reveals how quickly a 
change in policy can begin to shift people’s behaviors and decisions. Stanton asked 
Sherman to leave the room and the men stated that, “we unanimously feel inexpressible 
gratitude to him, looking upon him as a man that should be honored for the faithful 
performance of his duty.”81 This reinforces the idea that, while unintentionally, Sherman 
was recognized for his success in bringing abolition to the heart of the South.  
Shortly after this meeting Sherman issued Special Field Orders No. 15. While he 
created this policy with the help of Secretary Stanton, it was only able to come about due 
to his efforts in the march to the sea. The order designated certain land abandoned by 
plantation owners to be “set apart for the settlement of the negroes now made free by 
the acts of war and the proclamation of the President.”82 This order set apart 400,000 
acres of plantation land for the former slaves and by mid 1865, about 40,000 Black 
individuals were living on this land.83 This order was enormously significant, if it lasted. 
While the government had settled the question of emancipation, this order went so far 
as to relocate former slaves and endow them with property. This property was rich land 
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for farming endeavors and could work to help these African Americans start to gain 
footing in American society. In totality, Sherman’s march had wide sweeping effects on 
policy regarding African Americans and their access to freedom in Georgia.  
Effect on Southern Morale  
Word of Sherman’s march quickly spread and soon Georgians everywhere were 
lamenting his approach. Following the Union army win in Atlanta, Confederate 
President Jefferson Davis made his hatred of General Sherman and his plans public. 
Davis said in an address to Georgians, “Let us with one arm and one effort endeavor to 
crush Sherman.”84 Davis’ determination to crush Sherman was a clear representation of 
Confederate fear and hatred of Union presence in the South.  
There are many Southern accounts of Sherman’s March that reveal the depth of 
turmoil it wrecked upon the people of the Confederacy. Sherman and his men pitched 
their tents on plantation land and even used homes as temporary military bases.85 
Sherman humiliated the elite Southern class of men; he made himself at home in their 
living rooms and helped himself to their possessions. When the plantations owners were 
home, though, the Union soldiers sought to do everything in their power to weaken 
them as well as use their resources to survive.  
Mary S. Mallard was staying at a cotton plantation South of Savannah with her 
mother when she recorded her interactions with Sherman’s soldiers in December 1864. 
She wrote in her diary about being visited by troops half a dozen times; each visit by 
Sherman’s men left them with less and less. The men took food, livestock, trinkets from 
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inside the home and some of the slaves on the property.86 While Mallard wrote that 
some of the men respected Sherman’s order to not enter homes, she also wrote of men 
storming into her home, breaking down doors and digging through her personal items. 
She wrote with malice and hatred towards the “Yankees” and lamented their presence.87 
In one account said, “we look back upon their conduct in the house as a horrible 
nightmare, too terrible to be true.”88 Word spread of exactly this kind of interaction and 
fear within the state swelled. A brigadier general in Sherman’s army, John White Geary, 
wrote around the same time of Mallard’s account that “this last campaign of Sherman’s 
has almost disemboweled the rebellion.”89 These accounts give greater authenticity to 
the idea that Sherman’s march went deeper than physical damage. The march affected 
the way people felt in the South about the rebellion itself. Sherman broke down the will 
of Confederate people in Georgia to fight; Georgians were made to be helpless as their 
homes and were ransacked for sport. Sherman, with this military advance, landed a 
blow to the seat of the plantation system of power. This had rippling effects on the Black 
Americans who lived on these plantations; they watched as their “masters” were made to 
be completely helpless, weak and humiliated.  
All of the above anecdotes about Sherman’s March reveal the deep psychological 
effect his policy had on the Southern plantation society. This march hit the Confederate 
people in a way they feared most deeply; Sherman, in one military move, was able to 
strip the entire aristocratic class of Georgia of their land, their possessions, their wealth, 
the food on their table and, most of all, their slaves. The plantation owners fled when 
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able, but often found themselves sitting ducks when the Union soldiers arrived in their 
towns. As shown by the diary entries of soldiers and stories of harrowing moments 
experienced by the plantation owners, the destruction was enormous. Sherman was able 
to enter into the heart of Southern antebellum life and crush whatever wealth or 
prosperity still existed in late 1864. This way of life, the system of slavery, was supported 
by the plantation business. Sherman’s men stripped the fields and took the laborers 
wherever they went. If Georgia, as prosperous and strong as it had been, fell so easily, 
how would any other state fare? Sherman’s policy of pillaging, burning, foraging, and 
destruction intentionally or unintentionally helped dismantle the system that held Black 
men and women in slavery.  
In Conclusion 
By striking the Southern way of life on the home front, Sherman’s forces 
undermined the entire antebellum way of life. Sherman and his men charted a course of 
their own as they marched through Georgia blazing a new policy as they went. They won 
land, resources, and morale for the Union cause. The tactic of foraging for meals and 
living off Southern land shifted the burden of the war onto the Confederacy. Instead of 
Union lands bearing the weight of war (burned fields, ruined crops, destroyed cities) the 
Confederacy was paying for Union troop’s prosperity. With every plantation home 
ransacked, field burned, town torched the Union forces stole more and more wealth 
from the already financially weakened Confederate powers.  
William T. Sherman emancipated tens of thousands of African Americans still in 
bondage as he marched through Georgia.  It is in this way his policies had rippling 
effects for Black Americans. This, followed by his order that gave them land, proved 
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revolutionary for African Americans in a time when war was winding down and a Union 
win was in sight. 
  




 This research addressed the question of how a specific set of policies arose during 
the Civil War. In a time of chaos and unprecedented change, new questions came about 
to address what it meant to be a soldier, a free man and an American. Each political 
party and activist group of the time wrestled with the question of slavery. Democrat and 
Republican alike had to consider the effects of generations of policy supporting slavery 
and how to proceed. Not only that, but how to proceed as a united nation. It is in this 
tumultuous political environment I found grassroot policy initiatives most compelling.  
Our nation’s leaders followed the lead of those in lesser places of power and that made 
all the difference.  
 This deep dive into analyzing the policy origins revealed interesting points about 
the spontaneous cooperation between military officers and African Americans. The two 
groups did not always share the same morals or beliefs, but they both sought to do all in 
their power to win the war. This created a unique collaboration that yielded new and 
innovative policy.  
 While I am not arguing this is the first - or only - time people have used times of 
political upheaval to enact their own agendas, it is clear the Civil War provided a prime 
example of such policy actions. In the early to mid-nineteenth century the question of 
war, of secession, was tied closely to the question of abolition. From that stemmed the 
question of citizenship, freedom and equal treatment under the Constitution. Each 
individual I have mentioned shared varying views as to how to answer those questions. 
The differing and independent perspectives, I believe, are what make this case so 
fascinating; each person who touched these policies left their unique fingerprint. Such 
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policies did not just have war time ramifications; these influences changed the way 
people viewed African Americans in society. The outcome of these moments meant 
runaway slaves became refugees, laborers, and soldiers as free men. Policies generated 
in the heat of battle and deriving from absolute necessity found their way into the halls 
of Congress and the president’s desk at the White House. The varying decisions made by 
these individual actors spread throughout the Union, changing the fabric of our nation. 
In a time of decentralized power for legislative change, those without traditional 
influence found a voice and motivation to enact policy that would echo throughout 
history.   
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